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Could Neuro-Phenomenology Deepen an Interpretative
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Anna Sandfield and Peter Campion
University of Hull, Hull, UK
This article proposes a methodological stance, an Interpretative
Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) of participants’ drawings as one that is
useful for research into people’s experiences of seizure consciousness. Using
empirical examples located in an original, larger study, this article offers a
rationale for, and illustrates the analytic potential of, this combination. It also
considers that elicitation interviewing techniques and methods from the field
of neuro-phenomenology could take this work further in terms of deepening
the analysis by reaching people’s pre-reflexive conscious experiences. This
theoretical and practical combination has the potential to develop this work
significantly. Keywords: Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA),
Consciousness, Art Work, Seizures, Neuro Phenomenology, Elicitation
interview techniques, Pre Reflective Experiences
The focus in this paper on seizure consciousness in the context of an Interpretive
Phenomenological Analysis (IPA), is underpinned by the long standing clinical issue of
differentiating epilepsy from non-epileptic seizures (NES), and not the result of abnormal
brain activity and that these states are described very differently by people with both seizure
types (Furchner, 2002). It is important to differentiate epilepsy from NES because both types
of seizures require very different treatments and procedures, some epilepsy treatments being
unnecessary, inappropriate and potentially dangerous for people with NES (Ali, Rickards,
Bagary, Greenhill, McCorry, & Cavanna, 2010; LaFrance & Benbadis, 2006; LaFrance,
Gates, & Trimble, 2008). Given that there is no single clinical (Avbersek & Sisodiya, 2010;
Devinsky, Gazzola, & LaFrance, 2011) or historical feature that can pinpoint that seizures are
not epileptic (Alsaadi & Marquez, 2005), this has opened up the arena for methods other than
medical techniques to explore the differences.
Research using Conversation Analysis (CA) for example, has gone far in identifying
linguistic hints relating to either diagnosis and pinpointing further avenues to explore
(Featherstone & Sandfield, 2013). This work has provided evidence that there are reliable
differences between the way in which people with epilepsy and NES talk about their
experiences of seizure consciousness (Furchner, 2002; Gülich & Schöndienst, 1999; Plug,
Sharrack, & Reuber, 2008, 2009; Reuber & Plug, 2007). Seizure consciousness is thus the
focus of this article and Reuber and Kurthen (2011) identified two linked concerns to work
on further here. The first was to define what consciousness is for people with seizures
because how people with seizures experience consciousness has not been fully explored in
terms of its phenomenological quality and what, if any, higher cognitive processes a person is
using (what Reuber and Kurthen termed, access consciousness). Present definitions of
consciousness cannot adequately capture experiences or variations across subjective accounts
(Engel, 2001); the International League of Epilepsy (ILEA) definition not fully accounting
for "alterations in the subjective content of ictal consciousness" (Cavanna et al., 2008, p.
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184). In neurological settings if patients do not remember things, they are often perceived as
having been unconscious and measurements of “behavioural, constituent functions of
consciousness” along with descriptions by patients and observers may not represent the
“vividness” of a phenomenological seizure experience (Cavanna et al., 2008, p. 185).
Reuber and Kurthen‘s (2011) second concern is that given reflecting on consciousness
is an introspective act (Vermersch, 2009) the “methodologically impossible” task of
accessing this from ‘a third person perspective’ (Reuber & Kurthen, 2011, p. 102) constitutes
a hurdle to undertaking this work. Because we cannot see directly into “other minds” (Reuber
& Kurthen, 2011, p. 102) we can only try and make sense of another person making sense of
a particular phenomenon-a double hermeneutic (Smith, 2011). A way in which to do this is to
use a methodology that can access “first person experience of conscious states” (Moran,
2000, p. 15) and which IPA aims to do.
A related concern for us is that words for describing synesthetic sensations for
example, are not in everyday parlance and the lack of such a discourse could further hinder
our understandings of seizure experiences (Petitmengin, 2006). The “paucity of vocabulary
for describing these subtle sensations” is considered a main stumbling block to gathering
subjective descriptions (Petitmengin, Navarro, & Quyen, 2007, p. 751). Explicating these
from a phenomenological stance therefore, could be advantageous.
During the course of a larger exploratory IPA study I (VF) undertook, experiences of
consciousness were verbally described in great detail by two participants with epilepsy
diagnoses. These were supplemented with drawings by them. This paper describes the
interpretation of this data and begins an exploration of the concerns above. The paper also
suggests that using neuro-phenomenological elicitation interview techniques which aim to
reach people’s pre-reflective conscious experiences could add to this exploration. Husserl’s
existential, transcendental phenomenology challenged traditional science and third person
accounts because it explained consciousness by examining its structures within a person
(Moran, 2000). It is these structures neuro-phenomenological elicitation interview techniques
access, data from which can be subsequently entered into a “pheno-dynamic analysis.” That
is, the techniques can access the “pre-reflective micro-structure” of subjective processes
which mirror the “dynamical structure of the neuro-electric activity of the brain”
(Petitmengin et al., 2007, p. 746). Often data from neuro imaging are not enough in
themselves, requiring verbal descriptions of how they were experienced in order for them to
be interpreted fully (Petitmengin, 2006). Using a pheno-dynamic analysis, it becomes
possible to combine and analyse neural (medical) information alongside subjective
experiences (Petitmengin, 2006). This opens up the potential of phenomenological methods
to be included in empirical studies on seizure consciousness. Given its integration into
previous studies, a phenomenological attitude is the mode of access which could be
operationalised in the context of seizure consciousness reassessing the terrain in which
phenomenology can work. Scientific knowledge can then by supported by adding in the roles
of consciousness and subjectivity (Gallagher & Sørensen, 2006).
Consciousness in Philosophy, Neurology and Psychology
A philosophical understanding of consciousness considers people's subjective
experiences and the phenomenal nature of that experience as they describe it. This experience
consists of unifying experiences from various sensory modes into a new simultaneous
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experience, existing as a state of consciousness in its own right—phenomenological
consciousness (Tye, 2003). One way of thinking about whether someone is conscious or not,
is to consider the various degrees to which a person is self-aware. A conscious mental state is
one which is accompanied by what are termed higher order states—an individual considering
some thought or being aware of their mood or a bodily sensation. This constitutes the selfrepresentational theory of consciousness—i.e., a conscious state is only that if they are aware
of their own conscious state, external stimuli, their self and their awareness of those stimuli
(Uriah & Williford, 2006). Another way of considering whether a person is conscious is to
think of him/her being able to interact empathically with others in the social world at a given
time (Thompson, 2003) even though they may be experiencing a constant flow of altering
mental activity (Kalamangalam, 2001). However, someone could be conscious without any
evidence of interacting empathically with others thus further clarification of such terms as,
conscious, unconscious, awareness, unawareness and impaired awareness for example
(Johanson, Valli, Revonsuo, & Wedlund, 2008) could be useful.
Psychology, neurology, and philosophy-often working in isolation from each other
(Campion, 2009) - have differing conceptualisations and explanations of
consciousness/awareness (Zappulla, 1997). People experiencing seizures also have expert
knowledge of their seizures to impart (Tuckett, Boulton, Olsen, & Williams, 1985) and the
wealth of expertise emerging from these different perspectives needs to be combined and
realised (Depraz & Gallagher, 2002). Neurological data is becoming increasingly precise,
requiring a semantic clearly linked to subjective experiences. Attention should be paid
therefore, to what a person may be reflectively conscious of in this context (Vermersch,
2009). The accounts herein offer perspectives on subjective experiences during neurological
events and are relevant and timely. In terms of phenomenology and first person subjective
descriptions, phenomenology attempts to reach the “truth” of the manner in which “things”
appear to consciousness and before everyday common sense or scientific knowledge imposes
on what is being explored. This can support, clarify, or reject scientific knowledge by adding
in, and defending the need for, the roles of consciousness and subjectivity (Moran, 2000).
Given that (a) subjective experiences and descriptions are fundamental to understanding
consciousness and major factors in defining seizure types (LaFrance et al., 2008), and (b) that
a phenomenological view is absent in this field, a method such as IPA holds promise (Moran,
2000, p. 15) in explicating these.
Methodology: Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA)
IPA is rooted in phenomenological thought its founding principles being “that
experience should be examined in the way that it occurs and in its own terms” (Smith,
Flowers, & Larkin, 2009, p. 12). The notion of epileptic qualia--the “what it is like“ to
experience a seizure (Monaco, Mula, & Cavanna, 2005, p. 155) is the level and quality of
analysis an IPA aims to reach and the level adopted to explore the drawings herein. IPA’s
main premise is that our body shapes our knowledge about the world, and these “physical and
perceptual affordances of the body-in-the-world are significantly more important than
abstract or logical ones” (Smith, Flowers, & Larkin, 2009, p. 19). Unlike CA, where the
cognitions of conversation partners are peripheral to CA (te Molder & Potter, 2005), IPA as
a method has a major interest in cognition (Smith, 1996) and considers this a “science of
meaning making” (Smith & Eatough, 2006, p. 325) accessible through language (Smith et al.,
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2009). A person's cognitive and affective reaction to a phenomenon and how they speak
about their bodies relates to their thoughts and beliefs (Smith, Jarman, & Osborn, 1999). It is
this “chain of connection between accounts, cognition and physical state” (Smith & Eatough,
2006, p. 265) that is structured and organised, “open to being appropriated and understood by
others” and can thus be considered scientific (Giorgi, 1995, p. 38). IPA's specific focus on
individual (idiographic) embodied experiences, its stance on cognition and language and in
depth individual interpretations offers an excellent theoretical and methodological ‘fit’ for
exploring seizure patients’ experiences. These epistemological roots also lend themselves to
developing the method further.
“Doing” IPA
The way in which an IPA is conducted has been well documented (Smith et al., 2009).
The researcher begins by having one or more conversations with an individual in which
he/she endeavours to gain an understanding of a phenomenon in question while also
bracketing his/her pre-conceived ideas about it. Bracketing can be explained in mathematical
terms, i.e., the pre suppositions of a phenomenologist are put aside and treated separately, as
in a mathematical equation (Smith et al., 2009). However, when what we previously took for
granted becomes a phenomenon to be studied more deeply, we need to balance what we
already know about it and allow ourselves to discover and take into account what we did not
know. Suspending this “natural attitude” edits out temporarily, our previous assumptions,
concerns and engagement because we only attend “to what is given to us in intuition” with no
prior scientific or philosophical hypothesis being present in our “new” vista essential features
of the phenomena being truly isolated (Moran, 2000, p. 10). Suspending “all ontological
judgements about the nature and essence of things and events” allows us to reach what is real
to people (Holstein & Gubrium, 1998, p. 139). (Finlay, 2008, p. 8). Expanding Smith’s
mathematical allegory, our previous understandings, which we initially put aside, are taken
into account in light of what we have discovered anew and become part of our calculations or
eventual interpretations.
A second level of practice involves putting into operation the phenomenological
attitude which is not an easy task (Finlay, 2008). There are arguments for training
phenomenological researchers in spiritual methods which share Husserl’s epistemology
emphasising “knowledge by presence”, (Louchakova, 2005, p. 87) in order to gain the skills
necessary to do phenomenology (Berndtsson, Claesson, Friberg & Öhlén, 2007; Varela,
1996). Because it is within the researcher that the interpretation lies, training for
phenomenological researchers could, “enhance the capacity for knowledge” of a researcher
and “enhance direct intuition” (Louchakova, 2005, p. 87, 108). Asian philosophies are
implicated here, being “living manifestations of an active, disciplined phenomenology,” they
can be learned and can work to extend and complement science (Varela, 1996, p. 346).
Undertaking an IPA “requires an ability to be reflective, insightful, sensitive to
language, and constantly open to experience” (Van Manen, 1998, p. xi). The most important
thing being, “that the interpretation is inspired by, and arises” from participants' own words
(Smith et al., 2009, p. 90). In addition to an academic endeavour, an IPA is a personal,
creative and iterative process (Crist & Tanner, 2003) the researcher’s mind, knowledge and
imagination being the analytic tool (Louchakova, 2005).Finlay’s suggestion of “managing
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pre-understandings” (Finlay, 2008, p. 5) will also help us conceptualise phenomenon in terms
of our own biographies, knowledge and “fore-understandings” (ibid, p. 8).
Very small numbers of participants are advocated in IPA studies (Landridge, 2007),
individual cases unfold’[ing] how “something is” - even traditional science studying “unique
occurrences” (Smith et al., 2009, p. 30). The seminal work using CA mentioned above began
with very few cases, accumulating to around 100 in total over a decade and, “it is not
uncommon for the first studies in a new field to be descriptive in nature rather than being able
to provide robust demonstrations of clinical effectiveness” (Malzfeldt, 2013, p. 377).
Recruitment of Participants
Around 1500 people are referred to the Hull neurology clinic each year. The
consultant neurologist and his staff invited newly referred patients, including private patients
and patients from an acute admissions setting, to take part in an interview study. This
exercise was repeated six months later to maximise recruitment. Patients chosen for inclusion
were those newly referred without a clear diagnosis, that is, they could have had epilepsy or
NES or a combination of both. (New patients did not include those who had been referred on
from other hospitals for example, for a second opinion). Patients excluded were those who
were involved in court cases and patients with heart disease because seizures would be
secondary to their heart disease. From around 15 Patient Information Leaflets/personal letters
from me (VF) being distributed, four people expressed an interest in the study and agreed to
take part including the possibility of taking part in two interviews 18 months apart, in order to
gain a temporal view of their experiences. This appeared to be a hard to reach group because
no further patients volunteered to take part in the study. The study had Ethics & Governance
approval from Hull & East Yorkshire Hospitals NHS Trust. The data presented below is
taken from two conversations I had with both Vince and Dave (pseudonyms) whose
descriptions were rich and supplemented by drawings they did. They talked to me in the
context of an unstructured research conversation telling their stories on their own “terms”
(Haggman-Laitila, 1999, p. 15) and I implemented “… IPA’s inductive epistemology to its
fullest extent” (Smith et al., 2009, p. 70).
Previous Studies with the Art Work Of People with Epilepsy
Previous empirical, neurologically related studies heralded the beginnings of
differential diagnoses of seizures though an assessment of art work, in children (Kozma,
1978: Stafstrom & Havlena, 2003) and in adults (Anschel, Dolce, Schwartzman & Fisher,
2005). One on-going study 1 includes artwork which represents central experiences people
with these conditions would like to be more fully understood. In particular, the need for them
to be able to fill gaps in their consciousness upon emerging from seizures was apparent.
Another publication showcases over 200 pieces of art work, each created by a person with
epilepsy, capturing insightful images about what it is like to have this condition (Schacter,
2003). Art work from people with seizures has also been classified into themes which could
1
Sparks of Creativity: The Influence of Epilepsy and Migraines in Art. University of Melbourne.
http://sparksofcreativity.blogspot.com/2008/08/artistic-expressions-influenced-by_18.html. Retrieved from
Associated web site-Channel Z Artworks
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further understandings of “underlying neurophysiological bases of ictal (seizure) postictal and
interictal experiences” (Schachter, 2009, p. 14) including psychiatric morbidity and the
psychosocial aspects of the condition. People have depicted visual symptoms (not apparent to
others) which can mirror the “anatomic localisation of the seizure focus and/or the network
activated by the seizure which offers a window into brain-behaviour relationships and
neuroethology” (Schachter, 2009, p. 13), others drawing images depicting out-of-body
experiences. Postictal states, involving feeling a loss of contact with reality and distorted
visual perceptual, have also been represented as has the process of regaining consciousness.
There remains the potential to further interpret visual representations of people experiencing
seizures into “testable hypotheses” (ibid, p. 14). Drawings then have been used in
neurologically related studies and we consider that there is the potential for systematic
methods to elicit a scientific, deep analysis of people’s experiences in this context.
The Potential of Using Patient Drawings in IPA
I (VF) took drawing materials along with me to the interviews in case participants
found talking about their experiences difficult or if conversations faltered. When I asked
participants if they wanted to draw their experiences, Vince and Dave, did so, the other
participants declined. Vince drew one single figure and Dave several. Although the inclusion
of participants' drawings is not common in IPA, and this could be considered a definite
departure from the method, the drawings by participants in this study, although unexpected,
deserved attention (Bell, 2006). They depicted unusual physical experiences which offered
some insights into relationships between subjective experiences and external environments
(Johanson et al., 2008).
Creating and engaging with participants’ drawings can empower them and researchers
to present their stories in different ways. They can uncover interpretations which may have
been missed otherwise and/or offer a different view of a phenomenon (Glass, 2008). Using
similar non-linguistic forms of data has been used to try and gain descriptions which bypass
conventional ways of making sense of things, they can be useful for further discussion and if
people are not verbally articulate (Gillies et al., 2005). The art work below has left visual
traces of Vince and Dave’s lived experiences “transformed into transcended configurations”
(Van Manen 1998, p. 74).
Case 1. Vince
Vince, at around 60 years of age had experienced around seven seizures in a fifteen
month period, and commenced taking anti-epileptic drugs (AEDs) six weeks before I (VF)
met him. Between our conversations, neurology services had reconsidered his diagnosis,
whether he had post traumatic epilepsy from a road traffic accident (RTA) and/or whether he
had suffered a stroke. After being prescribed the AED Tegretol (carbamazepine) his seizures
lessened considerably and his diagnosis progressed in his medical notes to ‘probable temporal
lobe epilepsy’. Vince was finally diagnosed with complex partial seizures. Upon meeting me,
Vince, accompanied by his wife, launched immediately into his own personal embodied
experiences:
The way it actually happens when—I am talking normally and I still think I
am talking normally - but I seem as if I'm got lifted up and away and I am
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looking at ... Yes, you know in a sort of—almost in an empty atmosphere ...
Because you seem to be lifted as if –the atmosphere that keeps you held down
... No—it lifts you up and you almost feel as if you're floating ... if you're
floating then—the normal atmosphere that keeps you held to the ground ...
The gravity seems less restricting because you seem to lift up, you can see
who you're talking to—but even though you can see them, they seem to be a
long way away, and you know, you sort of come back down and when you
come back down, you don't really understand what it was ... well it seems that
where I'm concerned it's this thing where I seem to lift away and, I'm not me. I
don't know, but I'm looking at the people and even though they haven't
changed, I seem to have changed. Yeah, when so I come back down, it seems
... as if it's only natural. Yes, you float away and as you're floating you‘re
looking—they seemed to have gone further away from you and - you're
thinking - I can't really say whether the thinking is positive or negative.
When I asked Vince's wife (who was present in both our interviews) if she agreed with this
description she responded: “Yes I do really. He does seem to be—away” and turning to
Vince; “You're in a world of your own.” Disruption in Vince's consciousness is clear as he
goes into and out of his seizure. In relation to the self-representational theory of
consciousness described above, Vince demonstrates that he retains a conscious state in that he
is both self-aware and aware of external stimuli. The complexity and clarity in Vince's
descriptions of his different levels of awareness illustrates the inadequacy of polarities of
someone simply thought of as being conscious or unconscious (Gloor, 1986). Vince could not
articulate his awareness or perform voluntary movements during his seizure, because his
attention was being diverted inwards, and being taken over by, his epileptic brain activity. A
person in an epileptic seizure observed by others can be perceived as being completely
‘unconsciousness’ – as evidenced by Vince’s wife’s comments. However, this may not be
what the individual experiencing the seizure feels. Their ability to interact is simply
temporarily suspended and Vince remained very aware of the continuing presence of other
people even though he could not converse with them. However, notwithstanding his personal
experience of maintaining an awareness of the presence of others and knowing that others see
him as being unresponsive, Vince still perceived other people with epilepsy as being
completely unresponsive:
Cos there are some who just, they have no idea what they do because they totally
collapse, they are unconscious…Whereas I am still, to a certain extent—conscious in
that ... if not fully connected, I am conscious about what is happening and to a certain
extent that, I suppose, is good luck.
Towards the end of the first interview, Vince became vigilant in monitoring his
thoughts and feelings about his abilities to respond to others and his perceptions shifted
towards an understanding of how others could perceive him as being unresponsive:
And that is the thing about epilepsy, it is totally unconscious. Even although
you can see, when you're speaking you know what you are saying - but from
there to there the translation goes totally different, because you're not saying
what you're thinking instead of coming out with understandable,
understandable, words it's coming out [laughs] as absolute rubbish.
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In terms of the development of a seizure vocabulary, noteworthy was a particular
linguistic strategy Vince used. His ‘approximations ‘of his experiences are rooted in and are
simulations of experiences we all have some knowledge of (Gibbs, 2006) and added to our
understanding of what he was experiencing (Wilde, 2003). These included: “it almost felt as
if I’d been somewhere else,” “you seem to lift up,” “as if I got lifted up and away,” “almost
in an empty atmosphere,” “as if—the atmosphere that keeps you held down,” “it lifts you up
and you almost feel as if you're floating,” “it's this thing where I seem to lift away,” “they
seemed to have gone further away from you,” and, “I'm not me, I seem to have changed.”
(Italicised words are those that Vince emphasised).
Drawings: “I'll Let You Try and Work That Out—Even Though That Looks Like a
Fish” (Vince)
When I first offered Vince drawing materials, he did not think he could depict his
seizure in this way:
It was all—to draw it, all it would be would be a question mark. Yes, a question mark
– because, it is something I so definitely don't understand so what exactly is
happening is totally questionable. Yeah, and that is the obvious question mark and to
say it goes back far as where I had the brain damage in the car accident, yes.
However, whilst his wife was talking to me about family events, Vince began a
drawing of his seizure (Figure1) and talked to me as he completed it. In the drawing, Vince
drew what he thought simply resembled a fish. However, as he continued to draw he began to
construct his experience. This developed into a description of him entering into, being
engulfed by, and coming out of, his seizure. Simultaneously he was aware of on-going
external events he could not attend to.

Figure 1: ‘I'll let you try and work that out—even though that looks like a fish’
Vince’s verbatim explanation of his drawing
V: Do you understand that? (the drawing)

Valerie A. Featherstone, Anna Sandfield, and Peter Campion

9

VF: Erm, This is you – one, minute you are there –
V: The first I am there, then I come to there and then I come back coming
back, coming back, heading back to where I was before…
VF: Where you were before
V: on level ground and suddenly I seem to be above …
VF: Mmm, looking down on people.
V: Yes above, almost beyond and then I come back – but exactly what is
happening during that period is …
VF: Is, inside there? Mmm. What’s that?
V: I’m doing it wrong.
VF: Do you want a question mark?
V: Yeah
VF: It’s like that isn’t it –Yes. But you don’t know what is happening in that
space of time
V: Yeah, That’s a Spanish question mark –
V: A Spanish question actually starts before the question and you have that –
you have – sort of-this.
VF: What does that say-double, double?
V: You’re doubling, and in, while you’re in, while you're in there is a
question going in and a question coming back out because they’re unrealised.
VF: The questions haven’t been answered – yes.
V: Yes, basically (more drawing)
VF: Unrealised questions or…..
V: Yes. The whole lot there…
VF: Mmm, mmm
V: …is unrealised – to me. Other people see it but I don’t.
VF: Mmm
V: All I see is-sort of coming from there over there and then going back…
VF: Going back. Yeah I understand. So you could draw it.
V: I have been thinking about how to do it.
Vince continued expanding his descriptions after completing the drawing:
The whole circle around that there that's me—questioning going in, questioning
coming out. But still ... mmm, still unrealised because you don't really feel and if you
don't really feel, then the realisation is minimal. No the realisation is, if you feel
exactly what is going on—but you don't, so that makes it unrealised. Well that's
probably why it's so bloody confusing. You are going in with something and you are
coming out and other people realise you have gone in—you come out without any real
realisation.
Vince elegantly articulated levels of awareness never appearing to lose consciousness
completely as he appeared to be able to access, and constantly reflect on, subjective
experiences during his seizures whilst simultaneously knowing that he could not respond to
“exogenous stimuli” (Johanson et al., 2008, p. 170). He described shifts in his conscious
state, the illusion of being somewhere else but being cognisant that physically, he had
remained stationary. He describes “autoscopy” (out of body experiences; La France et al.,
2008, p. 318), differences in his self-awareness, visual and auditory illusions/hallucinations
and self-transformations (Parnas, Handest, Jansson, & Saebye, 2005). Also other
extraordinary experiences, including visual, auditory, tactile and motor perceptual
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experiences as well as “coenaesthesias” -which can include migrating sensations, sensations
of movement, lightness, levitation, elevation, somatic depersonalisation (Vollmer-Larsen,
Nandest, & Parnas, 2007, p. 346), and mental illusions of derealisation and depersonalisation
(LaFrance et al., 2008; Wolf, Schöndienst, & Gűlich, 2000).
For Vince this data appeared to belong to one phenomenological moment, that is, at
the second interview his previous insights had been forgotten. He continued to ponder on
whether things still appear to others as they did 18 months earlier, “I'm wondering instead of,
at a point when I'm talking to them, they hear me talking gibberish” to which his wife replied
that it did happen now and again. This provided an answer to Vince’s ponderings, “I don't
really notice it.” Similarly when asked if the drawing remained symbolic of his experiences
he said, “Well I don't seem to be getting affected the way I was there ... whether that is to do
with this [pointing to the drawing] I've no idea.”
At this point, his experiences had reduced into one of simply experiencing a very bad
headache, and waiting for this to abate, “No, what seems to happen is that, basically I get
pretty hot ... yeah, end up with a really stinking headache, which I can't get rid of for at least
half an hour.”
Although these descriptions continue to give an idea of what a seizure is like for
Vince, they did not have the phenomenological quality of his earlier descriptions. The second
time I (VF) saw Vince and asked him if he had any ideas for questions to ask of other people
he said, “All I say is please attempt to be totally self-descriptive because doctors can give you
an idea but the reality must come from the sufferers, because they are the only ones who can
or cannot.”
His comments reinforce the importance of subjective experiences in clinical decision
making (Olsen & Williams, 1985; Tuckett et al., 1985), that both medical and lay voices and
information are valuable and all need to be considered.
Case 2. Dave
Dave, in his forties, was diagnosed with idiopathic generalised epilepsy (a hereditary
disposition to seizures, (Baxendale, 2006). His EEG and CT scans were normal and after
being prescribed the AED Epilim (sodium valproate) his seizures decreased. Following a
physical assault he did not recall happening, a chip pan fire and a “near miss RTA” facts
being recorded in his neurology case notes, Dave was then prescribed other medications in
order to control his seizures. Immediately upon meeting Val, he expressed concern to her
about the danger he finds himself in because of gaps in his consciousness awareness: “Me
brain just seems to turn off and I can walk around. I've had smaller episodes like that inside
me flat where I'm looking at me bedroom wall the next thing I know I'm watching TV with a
cup of tea in me hand.” He also described times where, “I’m inside me flat, and I remember
going ‘aah’ and the next thing I can know is, I know, I’m on the floor, and I’ve pissed meself.
So I’ve struggled to get to bed, and I’ve been in bed.“
Dave also recalled another incident which had happened in between our two
conversations, in which he scalded his foot as he poured boiling water over it. His injury did
not require a skin graft but was obviously painful and not the kind of injury one would want
to impose upon oneself:
And erm I have scalded myself before, the worse one was ‘erm I found myself
er trying to make trying to make a cup of tea, er stood up-remember, pouring
boiling water on me foot, and I’ve got me sock on – right? And I can see
myself, actually seeing pouring boiling water on me foot and I can’t, I just
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cannot move me foot, it’s stuck, it's absolutely stuck... I can’t move me hand,
can’t move me hand, and I can see the water dripping and I’m thinking to
myself, move, move, just move. Then I’m thinking, if I can just get the sock
off me foot, then it’ll, it’ll just make it feel better, if I could just get the sock of
me foot, it’ll make it feel better, And it just will not move…it just slowly
started moving, just slowly, very, very slowly.
These events assumed more gravity when they began to happen out of doors, Dave
narrowly missing being killed by an oncoming lorry, having ‘come to’ just in time to avoid
this. He twice arrived home with planned purchases, not recalling actually buying either of
them. He described one of these:
So I'd ran through it in me 'ead, what I was gonna do ... so I've gone onto
automatic and actually done it. The next thing I remember is being stood on
the middle of a road looking at a lorry coming towards me. You see, the
trouble is I've got no memory in the gaps. I've tried to remember what I did,
I've zero, zilch. There are only the clues of the potatoes. So I've done
something, must have done something to there.
Dave was undertaking “complex behaviours without conscious awareness” (Seligman
& Kirmayer, 2008, p. 48). He retained “cognitive consciousness” which allowed him to act
to save his life, and his accounts offer some evidence of him using higher cognitive processes
during his seizure. At other times, he lacked, temporarily, “phenomenal” consciousness
(Monaco, Mula, & Cavanna, 2005, p. 156). Dave's experiences of ‘going onto automatic’ are
similar to these common everyday experiences we all have of walking or driving home
without an introspective awareness of the journey (Tye, 2003). These fluctuations in
everyday conscious experiences can result in “normative dissociative experiences” which can
happen spontaneously and merely involve “functional shifts in attention and information
processing” (Seligman & Kirmayer, 2008, p. 34). We can shut out our external environment
and perceive time as being suspended, (a suspension of self-reflective consciousness) (ibid).
Some level of consciousness obviously remains however, or accidents would occur (Monaco,
Mula, & Cavanna, 2005). Everyday dissociative experiences can be pleasurable and
contribute to enhanced functioning or performance, whereas abnormal ones, such as those
Dave is experiencing can be associated with “clinically significant distress” (Monaco et al.,
2005, p. 35). Dave perceived his experiences as abnormal and remained perturbed about
them.
Dave exhibited components of dissociation which interfere with his normal
perceptual, cognitive and attentional processing. His memory is disrupted for periods of time;
he experiences feelings of altered consciousness as being, “in a different world” until
“somebody breaks that world.” When asked what is happening to him whilst in this state, he
replied, “I don't know! It's basically [poses as a person having an ‘absence’ seizure, i.e.,
staring and immobile] that's it.” [PC: You feel you can't move?] “Yeah, basically, I'll try
again [another, similar pose] there you go!”
He based these poses on a flat mate’s description of what he looked like during these
times: “I’d go like that, he’d hear me mouth goes (smack smack) or hear me moan or
something. That’s when he’d say, ‘are you alright?’ I’d go what, what? He just says that I go
blank- just blank… apparently I just look away.”
The conversation triggered a memory from Dave’s childhood, to which he added his
newly acquired knowledge of seizure terminology, in a written postal communication to me;
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At approximately the same age we had Christmas dinner at me grandparents
and I must have had what I now know to be a Complex Partial because
apparently I had a dazed look in me face tried getting into me grandparents gas
cupboard and had a good chat with no one in particular of which I have no
memory! My mother noted later about this period and me she said I just
suddenly went cold towards her and my memory seemed slightly different. At
the age of 14-15 I was tearing apart sheets and blankets in my sleep and
waking up very tired. Doc gave me iron med.
Drawings (1): ‘What It Feels Like In My Brain’
Following an initial query from Dave: “What do you mean by draw?” Val, “Well,
whatever you think it feels like, just draw it”, Dave drew two drawings depicting how he
perceived his brain as working. These helped him expand upon how he felt on occasions
when he undertakes behaviours he can neither control nor remember. The first of the two
individual drawings (Figure 2, drawn in his first conversation with Val) described how he felt
immediately prior to his near miss RTA.

Figure 2: What it Feels Like in My Brain
The drawing depicts a crowd of people trying to attract Dave’s attention, but he
(drawn below them) is unable to respond. When asked what this felt like Dave replied:
Rough, er like something's pressing down, pulling down my head or whatever.
And I can just remember it's like being in a football crowd and everybody's
screaming at you for attention and you're not able to respond to any of
em…what it feels like, in my brains, that's a crowd, I'm half awake, half asleep
and this part (pointing to the front of his head) is where the scream is coming
from.
Again, considering contributions to a seizure discourse, Dave also uses a particular
linguistic strategy in his descriptions. “Metaphorical predicates” including “pressing down,”
“pulling down,” “everybody's screaming at you,” help to express the qualities of things and
experiences. Words such as “sharp,” “stabbing,” “pointed,” “pinched,” “lightening,”
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“cutting,” “dull,” “burning,” “searing,” “gnawing,” “convulsive,” “tickling,” “prickling,”
“electric,” and “pressing down” are other examples of words which could be valuable for
people. They add depth to the meanings of experiences without a person having to formulate
more complex metaphors (Menz, Lalouschek, Reisigl, Sator, & Frickey, 2005).
Dave appears to exhibit what could be seen as components of dissociation (i.e., an
interference with his normal perceptual, cognitive and attentional processes), his memory is
disrupted for periods of time. He has feelings of altered consciousness and of being, “in a
different world. ” However, he can become aware of other people around, all of a sudden
somebody can break into this world, “Are you alright? Really, are you alright? ”
When asked about his awareness of this other world he described it as feeling like:
It's like a daisy dream world ... it's like a black hole, if you went into a black
hole, time and space gets squashed, everything's starting to slooow down,
that's how it feels ... My mind just tried to blank it out.
Drawing (3): Divide My Head Into Quarters
Early in our second conversation, Dave explained through another drawing (Figure 3)
two distinct elements of his seizure experiences. One was how he perceived his brain as
working and the other was how this affected him emotionally.

Figure 3: Divide My Head Into Quarters
The first element is related to the physical attributes of his seizures:
Divide my head into quarters. That's me front [front of head depicted with
letter “F”] that's me right I get headaches there, I get headaches roundabout
that area and that area [areas marked with a black/grey scribbles] these are
intensities, like the darker it is, the more intense the pain can be. It doesn't
mean that it is going to be that intense, but that's how it can be intense. Er, er
and there ... Headaches and pains, that there could be lower back, sort of there
[indicates the back of his neck] this part, this part here, there, seems to be the
only part of my head that seems to be unaffected [the empty quartile in his
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drawing].’ That seems to the only part of my head that seems to be unaffected,
there—seems to feel? Seem to have something at the time.
The second element was his negative perceptions of his brain function, and his feeling
that there was some lessening of his cognitive abilities. He described how this felt:
I think I'd be oh, oh sort of erm … more stupider erm, that's sort of—one quart
less intelligent. Yeah—one quart less intelligent’ (the aforementioned empty
quartile in his drawing). There's a D***** inside that's always screaming to be
let out no, the good one.
In Dave’s second conversation with me, his attitude had shifted towards his seizures
beginning with frustration that these events happen to him and pose a grave danger, to
accepting that he can do nothing about them and with the knowledge that his cognitive
abilities were temporarily, severely compromised, to finally attempting to disassociate from
this part of himself:
I don't want to know it, I don't want to know it the thing that I've just, I don't
want to know. In general I don't want to know it. Oh yes I do stupid things, I
know I do stupid things. I don't want to know it, coconuts I don't wanna know
that I done the coconut things, I don't want to know I've walked across the
road that I could have killed myself, I don't want to know.
Vince, Dave too dismissed the relevance of this drawing when asked about it at his
second interview saying that he did not feel this anymore, putting it down to the side effects
of medication.
Discussion
We have offered a trail of evidence suggesting the value of drawings in elaborating
seizure consciousness in an IPA. Some of Reuber and Kurthen’s (2011) concerns have been
addressed. An IPA is useful for exploring the phenomenological quality of seizures and doing
this is not methodologically impossible. An IPA offers some idea of what seizure
consciousness consists of, it illustrated the vividness of the men’s accounts and that things are
not always what they seem to in terms of people’s apparent awareness/unawareness. The IPA
given the method’s focus on cognition also identified times at which Vince and Dave used
access consciousness and the phenomenological component of the method obviously holds
potential in this area of work. Vince and Dave described their conscious experiences as both
experts (in their seizure experiences) and novices (in seizure langauage). Bodily experiences
can shape participants' narratives (Öhlen, 2003) and most striking was the complexity and
insightfulness of Vince's initial descriptions contrasted with later ones. Initially, he described
his seizure experiences using language which facilitated powerful images of his cognitive
functioning during a seizure. He articulated cognitive and affective reactions to bodily and
visual sensations and also complex alterations in his levels of consciousness. Talking to me
and being able to draw his seizure facilitated Vince in reaching this awareness over time. He
demonstrated that he knew when he moved from being able to communicate with others, to a
complete inability to do this. He offered complex linguistic reconstructions which illustrated
Furchner’s seminal concept of a shift from “dynamic to static” state (Furchner, 2002) a
central feature in the accounts of people with epilepsy. He also became aware of how difficult
it was for others to understand the subjective nature of his experiences.
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Similarly, in an amalgam of lay and medical terminology Dave described how
experiences consisting of modality specific sensations, auditory and anomalous visual
perceptions and different levels of awareness and unawareness felt to him. His drawings
communicated further his experiences and his narrative was coloured with his own
idiosyncratic terminology including symptoms he described as‚ “hot poker,” “a needle stuck
in the foot,” “day dreams and weird worlds.“ Dave's experiences contained instances of him
retaining some “cognitive consciousness” allowing him to act to save his life, others illustrate
his “phenomenal consciousness.” Dave's seizures were observed occasionally by friends and
once by a clinic nurse corroborating his descriptions.
Creating the drawings facilitated “a special conversation” between participants and
Val and ‘complex interview interactions’ whereby participants explored and expanded upon
details, meanings and connections as they interpreted their work (Esin & Squire, 2013,
paragraph 2). The drawings succeeded in turning the conversations (Roberts, 2008) into ones
in which Vince and Dave offered their unique, linguistic contributions as well as insights into
their multiple, temporal experiences all breathing life into the data (Glass, 2008). In terms of
managing their condition, the drawings offered information about their seizures, information
about themselves, their day to day lives and the resources they had to manage their conditions
(Gillies et al., 2005). Interpreting visual representations of people experiencing seizures has
not been done to date in an IPA and more work is needed with both epilepsy and NES
patients with a view to exploring the differential diagnosis of both types of seizures.
Introducing patients’ drawings into the health community (Glass, 2008) could offer
alternative perspectives and interpretations of their situations (Battisti & Eiselen, 2008) and
could add value to time limited clinical conversations. Art used in psychoanalytic therapy for
example, has helped illustrate coping skills and strategies of people with seizures (Cregeen,
1996).
Vince and Dave’s verbal contributions and their drawings illustrate that complex
descriptions of seizures and consciousness are available and could be ‘accumulated’. In terms
of how the men’s experiences reflect back onto neurological data these descriptions could
potentially,
1) contribute towards diagnostic specific seizure discourses and
2) be combined with objective measurements such as EEG, brain imaging
and behaviour
In terms of (1), given the lack of knowledge about subjective seizure experiences of
consciousness and a lack of a consciousness discourse, building up a corpus of data from an
IPA would be valuable. Vince himself advocated the value of a lay addition to this discourse
- a factor also recognized in the CA work (Gülich, 2003; Schwabe, Howell, & Reuber, 2007).
Although Vince and Dave articulated their experiences well, the lack of an available seizure
vocabulary may inhibit others in describing these phenomena. Val not being a
neurologist may also have elicited data which were removed from definitions of
consciousness rooted in epileptology.
Most importantly for us was that capturing Vince and Dave’s descriptions and
drawings early mitigated against the loss/disappearance of their phenomenological
experiences over time. This being an issue to consider because medication and familiarity
with seizure language can alter patients’ perceptions of their experiences. The following
paragraph outlines the potential of (2) that is, the potential combination of phenomenological
and neurological data.
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Future Work: Combining Participants’ Drawings of Seizure Consciousness with NeuroPhenomenology
Neuro-phenomenological techniques (described briefly below) facilitate the detection
of deep experiential structures. Uncovering these structures could present us with ‘a rich and
largely unexplored source of information and data with dramatic consequences’ (Varela &
Shear, 1999, as cited in Petitmengin, 2009, p. 9; see also Landridge, 2007). Neurophenomenology utilises the ideas of systems theory and that, in terms of epileptic seizures,
these are not a sudden and unexpected occurrences but one which can be anticipated being
the result of a elements of a system and “its general (spatial and temporal) dynamics”
(Petitmengin et al., 2007, p. 747). That is, seizure onset is seen as an on-going, dynamic
process which can begin days, hours or minutes beforehand (Petitmengin et al., 2007). It
follows that the subjective cognitive experiences of epileptic seizures also unfolds and this
takes time to become aware of as happening and, subsequently, to describe (Petitmengin,
2006, p. 230).
Brain patterns are known to be related to people’s “subjective states” (Petitmengin,
2006, p 125), descriptions being correlated with “neuronal dynamics of the electro-clinical
onset of a seizure” (Petitmengin, 2006, p. 124). In terms of 2) above, these subjective
experiences represent first person direct descriptions of cognitive processes which can help
with the interpretation of other data such as that being recorded with neuroimaging
techniques and could form the basis of new “paradigm for a neuro-scientific approach to
epilepsy” (Johanson et al., 2008, p. 171). Potentially these could harbour the possibility of
differentiating these from NES. Generating a large corpus of data has the potential to be
translated into concrete, practical ideas as heuristics, concepts or principles, which could
inform the neurosciences, moving towards an “objective interpretational empirical
framework” (Gallagher & Sørensen, 2006, p. 131). IPA studies for example, have the
potential to help develop theory through a process of “analytic induction” (Smith, 1999, p.
413), Neuro-phenomenology could then form an integral element of multi-method
interdisciplinary approaches. There are however, issues to consider when exploring
consciousness further and the task of knowing and describing subjective experiences is not an
easy one for people because they can perceive phenomena pre reflectively without being
consciously aware of this. To develop descriptions requires a phenomenological reduction
and a direction of attention exclusively to one’s own personal experience of the world,
putting aside other ideas, beliefs or theories about that experience (Gallagher & Sørensen,
2006). Thus, there is also the potential for participants as well as researchers, to be trained in
such methods (Finlay, 2008; Varela, 1996). This would facilitate the knowing of experiences
and offer findings that are even more “experience-close” (Smith et al., 2009, p. 204).
Neuro-phenomenological Elicitation Interview Techniques
The process of becoming aware of one‘s pre reflective experiences consists of coming
into closer contact with something that was previously unknown. Describing these can be
facilitated at two levels; the level of experience, and at the level of becoming aware of the
how of this experience (Petitmengin, 2009). The how can be reached by incorporating
interview techniques which access the “pre-reflective micro-structure” of subjective
processes (Petitmengin et al., 2007, p. 746). Elicitation interview techniques (Petitmengin,
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2009) facilitate a finely detailed and guided exploration of important elements of people’s
recent experiences so that they can become aware of pre reflexive processes and develop their
phenomenological descriptions of these (Gallagher & Sørensen, 2006). These techniquesmuch like Wundt’s participants in his experiments on introspection in the 19th century and
who were asked to describe the “pure” perceptions as they appeared in ‘their consciousness,
(Gallagher & Sørensen, 2006) render the descriptions of lived experience reproducible thus
offering scientific validity (Petitmengin, 2009). Memories, images, sensations, sounds and
the fragmentation of the temporal course of an experience all have the potential to be evoked
by an elicitation interview. The participant relives the experience, their attention being
directed towards visual, kinaesthetic, auditory or olfactory triggers, felt emotions or internal
dialogues, all of which may have been pre-reflective until expertly elicited and brought into
consciousness.
The alliance of IPA with neurology has already been mooted (Smith et al., 2009) and
phenomenological methods have already been assimilated into empirical studies exploring
patients’ experiences of epileptic seizures (Le Van Quyen & Petitmengin, 2002; Petitmengin
et al., 2007). However, there is the question of whether the close focus integral to neurophenomenological techniques and methods fit into the current spirit of IPA. Although some
argue that accessing pre-reflective conscious experiences could sit well with IPA (Landridge,
2007; Willig, 2001) this explicit focus would go beyond its boundaries as they stand today.
Conclusion
Our study has demonstrated for the first time how an IPA of participant drawings has
generated in-depth, first person embodied descriptions of seizure consciousness. The
approach has the theoretical and methodological potential to uncover conceptualizations of
seizure experiences previously unheard. This work formed the basis for our ideas for using
neuro-phenomenological interview methods and techniques to explore seizure consciousness
with participants’ articulations about their drawings. . If it is the case that self-expression
through various forms of art is an underused tool in neurology (Stafstrom, 2005) we suggest
that this could add significantly to work in the field.
All of this indicates the usefulness of a paradigm shift in seizure exploration in terms
of locating new vistas to explore.
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